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Promoting renewable energy as a matter of public interest often places governments in situations of collaboration 
with private parties, especially in initializing innovative projects, such as on setting up biogas grids. Against the 
backdrop of a Dutch example of such a project, this paper aims to provide a framework as a guideline in the 
process of analysis, choice and design of the proper type of Public-Private Partnership (PPP), especially in terms 
of ‘legitimate public governance’. The latter concept merges Beetham’s three dimensions of legitimacy (legality, 
shared beliefs and consent) with a distinction between three types of governance mechanisms (market, network 
and hierarchy). It provides the backbone to the distinction between three types of PPP which can readily be 
exemplified by types of sustainable energy initiatives. Then, 5 phases of the aforementioned framework are 
presented (establishing public interest, considering coordinative values and risks, choice of legal form). In 
following the sequence of these phases, governments can perform an ex ante analysis in which form follows 
function (as in type of PPP first, then type of legal form) and by which legitimate public governance can be 
properly secured in energy innovative PPP projects.  
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This paper is about how to promote renewable energy innovation through forms of public-
private partnership (PPP), as a matter of public interest. We propose a general framework, 
which may provide support in the design of proper PPP-arrangements, especially for 
renewable energy projects, for which we use an example from Dutch practice as empirical 
showcase. 
  
In order to achieve a low carbon economy in 2050, the Dutch government, by concluding 
climate accords at national and international level (EC, 2011), committed itself to the target of 
14 per cent of energy consumption in its area being of renewable energy by 2020 (ELI, 2011). 
To achieve such sustainability ambitions it is reliant on technological innovations in the 
energy sector. To give these technological innovations a realistic chance of success, the Dutch 
government initiates policy projects with private parties in partnerships.  
There are several examples of such projects in the Dutch energy policy field. The collective 
purchasing of solar panels and offshore windmill parks is one attracting considerable interest. 
Another important category of initiatives is that of projects in the field of biogas. An example 
of such an initiative is the Salland Green Gas project, located in the Dutch province of 
Overijssel. Taking the Salland Green Gas project as a starting point, this paper illustrates that 
policy tools must respond to the dynamics in innovation processes. Beyond this illustration 
we present an ex-ante analysis framework relevant to the selection and design of appropriate 
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and legitimate forms of PPP. These forms are illustrated by distinct types of organisations and 
policy-arrangements as feasible in renewable energy projects. The analysis framework is then 
presented as a phased plan, which underpins the proper selection of PPP-type and legal form, 
while balancing between legal-administrative values of effectiveness and legitimacy in the 
context of renewable energy projects. 
 
 
Changes in energy governance 
Recent decades have shown major changes in the energy sector in the Netherlands. One of the 
most striking changes is the splitting of the integrated energy companies; separating the 
network activities from the production and supply activities. These activities have then been 
placed in dedicated newly established organisations, based upon original public enterprises, 
but henceforth coordinated autonomously. Firstly, network companies have been set up. 
These companies are responsible for the network activities and are regulated hierarchically 
within the circle of government (Kist et al., 2008). Secondly, production and supply 
companies have been established. The activities of these latter organisations have been placed 
at a distance from government (generally also by selling government shares), so that the 
operations of the production and supply companies take place in the ‘free’ energy market. 
 
Public Interest concept 
The concept of public interest is important to understanding these energy sector reforms. In its 
report, “The safeguarding of public interest”, the Dutch Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (WRR) makes a distinction between three types of interests: (i) individual, (ii) societal 
and (iii) public interests (2000: 19).
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 Whilst individual interests are regarded as of a personal 
nature, the WRR defines societal interests as interests relevant to society as a whole – such as 
energy, but also food, transport, education, (health) care and others  (2000: 20). According to 
the WRR, a societal interest becomes a public interest if and when government commits itself 
to (the protection of) a particular societal interest on the basis of the conviction that this 
interest will not otherwise be properly served (or safeguarded) (2000: 20).  
In our (liberal state inspired) opinion, it is important to note that the mere fact that a societal 
interest, say sustainable energy supply, is regarded (by government) as a public interest, does 
not exclude the possibility for private persons to (continue to) spontaneously involve 
themselves with sustainable energy as a societal interest.
2
 Matters with a public interest do not 
(automatically) become an exclusive zone of government, but one may expect that private 
involvement will be affected by government (regulation), as may be the case when in the 
pursuit of sustainable energy objectives, government advances certain resource alternatives 
over others.  
 
Energy Sector reforms 
The aforementioned energy sector reforms are the result of various political stands on related 
public interests. A number of parties represent important positions in the sectoral debate. First 
of all, the European Commission is important as it may be regarded as the leading protagonist 
of the liberalisation wave in the energy sector. The Commission puts the public interest of a 
properly functioning, internal/common energy market, and accompanying consumer 
protection, at the forefront of its policy choices underlying the European liberalisation 
directives (Wilkeshuis, 2010; Burkard, 2008). In the energy market the consumer shall have a 
proper freedom of choice. As a result the consumer may not be dependent on just the one 
provider (a monopolist) of energy. Instead the buyer of energy should be able to make a 
comparison between different producers and suppliers, to then select the provider that (best) 
meets his energy demand. The main objective is, that as a result of this confrontation between 
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supply and demand, the price mechanism steers buyers and energy companies towards an 
optimum transaction.  
Despite the European impetus to liberalise utility sectors, such as the energy sector, the degree 
of liberalisation and the approach used, do in practice differ from one member state to another 
(Wilkeshuis 2010: 35). Implementation of the Commission’s policy is thus subject to ‘the 
powers that be’ within the member states (see, applied to the Dutch case, Wilkeshuis 2010), 
especially the positions of national authorities, such as Ministers of Economic Affairs or of 
Energy (and other utilities) and the national Parliaments. Initially, the thinking of the Dutch 
Minister of Economic Affairs was, that a properly functioning energy market, including 
proper consumer protection, could be achieved by positioning the then integrated energy 
companies, as such, on the market, that is each encompassing production, distribution and 
network management. The realisation of this thinking was conceived as privatisation of the 
relevant integrated energy companies once liberalisation had set in. This proposal however 
was resisted by the Dutch parliament. In the political debate the parliamentarians did not just 
attach importance to the aforementioned public interests. They also raised the issue of 
safeguarding security of supply and of distribution network quality. This was because the 
members of parliament feared that these interests would come under pressure if the activities 
of the integrated energy companies were to be organised independent from the government. 
The outcome of the political debate was, that these public interests were to be safeguarded by 
separating the energy network management, both economically and legally, from the 





Simultaneously with the (debate on and actual) liberalisation of the energy sector and the 
split-up of integrated energy companies, the theme of climate change moved higher up the 
political agenda. Increased societal awareness has lead to an increasingly emphatic appeal to 
the government to respond to climate change. This societal interest has subsequently been 
picked up by government to also become a public interest. In the Netherlands, the “New 
energy for the climate” work programme is testimony to this public commitment. The report 
illustrates that government is taking responsibility in the field of climate change, and sets out 
how the Netherlands will have to and can become one of the most efficient and clean energy 
societies in the European Union by 2020 (VROM 2007: 3). To achieve this ambition, central 
government has concluded administrative accords on climate and energy with local 
authorities.
4
 Agreements have also been reached with the business community; set out in so-
called sustainability accords.
5
 The relevant policy initiatives for curbing climate change are 
formulated in both these administrative and sustainability accords. The following targets are 
key to this policy: (i) a 30% cut in greenhouse gases by 2020 compared with 1990, (ii) an 
energy conservation percentage of 2% per year, and (iii) a share of renewable energy sources 
of 20% in 2020 (VROM 2007). The Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs aspires a mode of 
energy supply, which provides the highest possible environmental quality, as indicated by the 
label ‘clean energy’ (2008: 14). According to government the sustainable energy economy 
that can live up to this ambition, but success will require a joint effort of society and 
government (ELI, 2011: 5). Consequently, to achieve these policy objectives, public and 




An example of public-private sustainability initiatives 
The Salland Green Gas project is a fine example of such a public-private sustainable project 
initiative, with energy relevance. 
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On 14 January 2009 central government and the Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO) 
signed the Climate and Energy Accord valid between central government and provinces. By 
signing the accord the provinces are endorsing the importance of the national and European 
sustainability ambitions. In addition to their statutory task, the provinces will contribute to the 
achievement of the climate objectives as they see fit, and if possible will do so together with 
other public and private partners.  
 
Even before the signing of the Climate and Energy Accord by central government and the 
IPO, the importance of sustainable development had been identified and recognised by the 
Province of Overijssel, as is expressed, for example, in the Overijssel Energy Pact 
Programme. With the energy pact the province aims at, amongst other objectives, a cut in 
CO2 of 30% by 2020 compared with 1990 (Province of Overijssel 2008). According to the 
province, this target can be achieved by an intensive and long-term approach, in which 
partnership arrangements are concluded with partners in the policy domain. This approach has 
two spearheads: (i) energy conservation in households and businesses and (ii) sustainable 
generation of energy. The plans for sustainable generation of energy have been elaborated in 
the provincial Bioenergy sub-programme.  
 
The Bioenergy sub-programme is a major component of the Energy Pact for the reduction of 
CO2 emissions and aims to achieve 52% of the total CO2 reduction. To achieve this 
percentage the province is, amongst others, making efforts to get the production and supply of 
biogas and/or green gas to consumers (households and/or businesses) started. A critical 
success factor for the production and supply of both biogas and green gas is the existence of a 
regional energy infrastructure. This infrastructure is called a Green Gas Hub. A Green Gas 
Hub is an infrastructure for the production, supply and offtake of Green Gas. Producers of 
biogas, such as pig farmers and market gardeners, supply their biogas to a central plant 
through a pipe. In this central plant the biogas is upgraded to the natural gas quality (green 
gas) and the end product can be fed into the natural gas network, which exists throughout 
Overijssel (and indeed throughout the Netherlands).  
 
The ambition for a Green Gas Hub has been embedded in a dedicated project by the Province 
of Overijssel. As the Green Gas Hub is being implemented in the Salland area, the 
northwestern part of the province, the project goes by the name of Salland Green Gas. Salland 
Green Gas can rightly be regarded as an innovative project. After all, there are only a few 
Green Gas Hubs in the Netherlands and, both for the technologies to be used and the 
administrative organisation around it, the project must be set up from scratch. To make this a 
success, the Province of Overijssel is working with the municipalities of Olst-Wijhe, Raalte, 
Deventer, with the Saxion University of Applied Sciences, the network company Enexis and a 
joint municipal enterprise on waste-disposal called ROVA. Parallel to the execution of the 
project, the Province of Overijssel has in 2011 elaborated the Green Gas Master Plan, which 
identifies the most promising clusters for bioenergy (potential Green Gas producers, large 
volume energy users, current infrastructure). The Salland Green Gas project is an integral part 
of this Master Plan.  
 
Upon reflection 
The Salland Green Gas project is a concrete example of the efforts of the Province of 
Overijssel to respond to climate change. The province has an active role in both the initiation 
and the execution of the project. This role-perception is in keeping with the role pattern for 
government as outlined in the aforementioned “New energy for the climate” work 
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programme. The work programme speaks of an initiating role for government so that test beds 
emerge for the application of innovative energy-saving techniques (VROM 2007: 42). It is 
perfectly conceivable that such a role-perception can match policy initiatives to curb climate 
change.  
 
Meanwhile, a fundamental question arises in the context of the earlier liberalisation wave in 
the energy sector. Liberalisation did, after all, have as its consequence that the players in the 
energy sector were placed at arms length of government. How then can the public sustainable 
energy interest be safeguarded, given that, with market or network failure in spontaneous 
organisation of green gas initiatives, government will need to be involved?  
A solution to this problem appears to be available. The national “New energy for the climate” 
work programme proposes that there are opportunities for public-private partnership (PPP).
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Unfortunately, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning & the Environment (VROM) does 
not provide any further elaboration of this line of thinking.  
 
This is where this paper may be relevant as it aims to assess the various governance 
opportunities that actually exist for PPP, and present suggestions as to the way in which a 
proper appraisal can be made for dedicated PPP-governance arrangements. The proposal of an 
ex-ante analysis framework is key to this attempt. The focus of this framework will be on 
legitimate public governance, as our point of departure lies with the public sustainable energy 
interest and the hitherto use of government resources and influence (legal and otherwise). 
Clearly, the mere fact that PPP is – as it is in the Netherlands – ‘officially’ proposed by 
government as a solution for realising innovations effectively, this alone does not sufficiently 
underpin the legitimacy of PPP in coordinating innovative action in the energy field. In this 
day and age of governance, and given the especially interactive nature of PPP, the merits of 
various PPP-arrangements require a more substantive logic.  
 
In the following we first give a brief description of ‘legitimate public governance’. 
Subsequently we will name the main steps towards a proper choice of PPP formats and 
clarify, also by providing practical description, which types of PPP can be employed towards 
sustainable energy objectives. 
 
 
Legitimate Public Governance 
 
To arrive at a concept of ‘legitimate public governance’, we merge specific approaches on 
both the legitimacy of public authority and the notion of public governance as coordination of 
transactions involved in creating and allocating public goods, works and services.  
 
Legitimacy 
In the public administration and public policy literature, the concept of legitimacy has 
received considerable attention from various authors (e.g. Weber 1922, Luhmann 1969, 
Beetham 1991, Scharpf 1998). We consider Beetham’s view on legitimacy of the public 
exercise of authority as especially useful our needs. Not only does this provide a cross-
disciplinary perspective (encompassing both normative and socio-empirical disciplines), its 
modelling as an ex-post analysis framework may, in our view, also be applied ‘in reverse’. 
This is to say that Beetham’s three dimensions of legitimacy (1991: 15-16) may be used, not 
only to (ex-post) empirically test a given exercise of public authority, but also to serve as 
stepping stones of an ex ante analysis framework, leading to a proper – legitimate – choice 
and design of the applicable governance arrangement, such as PPP. 
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The three dimensions, which together constitute the – cumulative – conditions for legitimate 
exercise of public authority, are: 1. legality; 2. shared beliefs; 3. consent. Table 1 presents a 
summary:  
 
Table 1: The three dimensions of legitimacy (Beetham 1991, p. 20, Table 1.1) 
Criteria of Legitimacy Form of Non-legitimate Power 
1. Conformity to rules (legal validity) Illegitimacy (breach of rules) 
2. Justifiability to rules in terms of shared beliefs 
 
Legitimacy deficit (discrepancy between rules and 
supporting beliefs, absence of shared beliefs) 
3. Legitimation through expressed consent Delegitimation (withdrawal of consent) 
 
Dimension 1. (‘legality’), requires legally valid exercise of authority, as the ‘law stands’ – 
including unwritten rules (Beetham, 1991: 64 et seq). Legal rules make (autonomous) social 
regulation possible, also as a result of government’s adherence to the law, also known as the 
‘rule of law’ (Heldeweg & Sanders 2011).  
Dimension 2. (‘shared beliefs’), requires that the rules by which we must act are also 
intrinsically justified (Beetham, 1991: 69 et seq). They must be based on ‘normative 
principles’, which express shared value perceptions concerning the citizen-government 
relationship (standard setter and standard addressee respectively). Their justification follows 
either from their origin (vested in some accepted ‘societal source’) or from their content 
(vested in substantive convictions that relate to these rules) (Heldeweg & Sanders 2011).  
Dimension 3. (‘consent’), refers to voluntary consent of the subordinate(s) with the political 
exercise of power by the dominant actor (Beetham, 1991: 91 et seq), as by democratic 
mechanisms (Heldeweg & Sanders 2011). 
 
In our view these dimensions are traceable not only in governance contexts where government 
operates hierarchically – such as by compelling energy producers by law to apply (a certain 
percentage of) renewable resources. They also apply in other governance contexts where 
government is involved in the explicit pursuit of the public (energy) interest, especially by 
market transactions – as in a ‘green energy’ criterion used in tendering for public transport – 
or by social network interaction – such as in negotiating with housing corporations and other 
NGO’s on green energy initiatives in urban areas. This is in keeping with Beetham’s claim 
that his approach is universally applicable and that, of course, it can be specified, “… to 
assess the legitimacy of power in its context, i.e. against the norms and values of a given 
society.” (1991:21). 
 
Types of coordination 
Thus government can, as with determining how to pursue its sustainable energy policy 
objectives, choose between three types of coordination, as transaction mechanisms by which 
(or arenas in which) public goods, works and services are created and allocated: (i) market, 
(ii) network, or (iii) hierarchical coordination (see Thompson 1991: 1). 
 
Market coordination is useful to government policies especially when government wants to 
match effectiveness with efficiency, through a voluntary exchange between supply and 
demand. Government regulation may secure that, for example, energy producers must use 
renewable energy, which then causes these producers to approach the energy resources market 
and enter into transactions with suppliers. Ideally these transactions will follow from a 
comparison between competitive alternatives, based on full information and with a clear view 
on the optimisation of their own welfare function – which is profit but also adherence to 
regulation.  
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Hierarchical coordination (in the public realm),
7
 exists when public interests are pursued by 
government control. Subordinate private (citizens) and (lower) public parties are under 
regulatory command, which compels them to act in accordance with given norms or technical 
requirements, so that their conduct may serve or be in keeping with the public interest 
objective.
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 Effectiveness and efficiency are served by the ability of unilateral (‘top-down) 
government action, such as in prohibitions or commands in the field of (non) renewable 
energy resources or energy efficiency. 
Network coordination is useful to government as it provides a setting in which the 
participating autonomous actors try to reach agreement on a strategy to achieve a policy goal. 
It is not the price mechanism that controls network transactions, as is the case with the 
market, nor unilateral authority, as in a hierarchical setting; it is the consensual interaction 
between equal parties participating towards a shared opinion and  - hopefully – shared or 
aligned action, given a mutual dependency of participants in – optimally – reaching a shared 
objective (Powell, 1990). As government, for instance, seeks to promote innovative 
sustainable energy projects, it may want to join forces with societal actors who share in the 
desire to get such projects underway, but fail to do some by themselves.  
 
Cross referencing 
We may now combine Beetham’s view on legitimacy with three types of public governance, 
involving government in pursuit of public interests – such as that of sustainable energy – 
together presenting a framework of legitimate public governance.  
The cross-sections that we yield are basic governance arrangements, presenting options in 
terms of types of transactions and involved actors (relations), as well as related conditions. In 
this paper we limit our analysis to the legitimacy perspective of these governance 
arrangements, which means that we do not elaborate on the aspects of comparative 
effectiveness and efficiency which each arrangement may provide, given the nature of the 
relevant policy area – such as that of (renewable) energy. Our scope is limited to the 
analytical perspective as presented in the following table (2): 
 
Table 2: Cross-referencing legitimacy and public governance  
‘Legitimate Public Governance’ 
Legitimacy according 
to Beetham 
Public Governance in three types of coordination 
Market (M) Network (N) Hierarchy (H) 
3- dimensions: legal, 
shared beliefs, consent 
To be discussed – see 
results in table 3 
To be discussed – see 
results in table 3 
To be discussed – see 
results in table 3 
 
It is of great importance to understand that the types of coordination are ideal types, and that – 
especially with the examples given – government may choose different forms to shape its use 
of any of the three possible types of coordination. These forms may relate especially to the 
use of different types of legal personality by which government operates within these 
mechanisms – as there are different public law types of legal persons (e.g. parliaments, 
ministers, municipalities, quango’s) and different private law types of legal persons (e.g. 
associations, foundations/trusts, enterprises). Clearly, apart from aspects of effectiveness and 
efficiency, the aspect of legitimacy, as conceptualised within a certain type of coordination 
may necessitate or exclude certain forms, such as a public body, not a private enterprise as 
sovereign legislator. Similarly, as we will show in the below, the possibility of a PPP 
approach may exist within each type of coordination, but will come in different forms of PPP, 





Ex ante analysis framework 
Against the backdrop of this analytical perspective we will now present a concise framework 
that enables an ex ante analysis, providing a guideline to choosing and designing the proper, 
legitimate public governance arrangement in the form of a PPP-type of collaboration, as in the 
(Dutch) field of sustainable energy initiatives. 
The framework consists of a phased plan with five consecutive steps: (i) establishing the 
public interest, (ii) considering legitimate public governance, (iii) considering risks, (iv) 
choosing the PPP type, and finally (v) choosing the legal form. 
 
Step 1: establishing the public interest 
Before government concludes to apply PPP, it must decide whether it has any role to play in 
the promotion or protection of a societal interest, such as sustainable energy. As follows from 
the above discussion on different types of interests, such involvement is not necessary per se, 
as many societal interests are in fact taken care of without (dedicated) government 
involvement (WRR, 2000: 20). However, especially innovative and sustainable quality and 
universal accessibility of societal interests can be problematic, and government may have to 
step in to provide safeguards – i.e. on the basis of the conviction that this societal interest 
concerned will not otherwise be done full justice (WRR 2000: 20).  
One may argue that in such cases we witness forms of market or network failure, in the sense 
that markets and/or networks seem to be incapable of adequately providing for – proper 
quality of and access to – these societal interests. Consequently, on the basis of political 
assessment, argumentation and debate, government can decide to make such a societal interest 
object of its policy, thus labelling it (also) as a public interest (WRR 2000: 21). As we have 
seen in the above, in the Netherlands the societal interest of sustainable energy has acquired 
this status by virtue of the  “New energy for the climate” programme. 
 
The (pre-eminently political) decision to consider a societal interest (to also be) a public 
interest, should be distinguished from the decision on how government must give shape to its 
task and responsibility in service of this interest. We need to, in other words, separate the 
‘what’ (may be considered a public interest?) from the ‘how’ (to promote and protect a public 
interest) (WRR 200:21). Hence, to proclaim, for instance, sustainable energy to be a public 
interest, is not to say that only government may decide on this policy and only government 
may be involved in the execution of it. Setting the energy policy may be a subject for which 
government may seek counsel with industry and NGO’s, and executing energy policy may be 
done by also bringing in private parties (2000: 21). Of course, the final responsibility for both 
policy and execution rests with government, but that does not exclude (quite apart from 
spontaneous private actions – as discussed in the above), that explicit arrangements are made 
to facilitate private party involvement. Clearly, the need for explicitness of these 
arrangements follows from the fact that government involvement results from existing market 
and or network failure, such as in delivering sustainable energy. Given this actual failure, 
government cannot (or no longer) expect spontaneous, unregulated private party participation 
to deliver all the necessary input. This begs the question if such participation is feasible, as 
through PPP, and if so, how this input can be coordinated to provide its highest added value. 
So we are faced with a two step preliminary consideration which is discussed in steps 2. and 
3. (as a prelude to the choices of PPP-type and form in steps 4 and 5). ‘Step 2.’ will be about 
considering options in terms of modes of legitimate public governance, whereas Step 3. will 
be concerned with specific innovation risks related to particular modes of governance. 
 
Step 2: considering legitimate public governance 
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Where government takes final responsibility for a particular societal interest as a public 
interest and expresses preference for promoting or protecting this interest through PPP, the 
main question is how this type of partnership can be coordinated. As we saw in the above, 
there are three main and ideal type forms of coordination, as modes of public governance: (i) 
market, (ii) network and (iii) hierarchy.  
In this second step we will look at the distinctive characteristics that various types of 
coordination offer, especially in terms of the kind of legitimacy that each type may provide. 
We prefer to consider these configurations of legitimacy characteristics as ‘opportunities’ or 
positive indicators (to secure acceptance for a type of coordination) – we regard Step 3. as 
rather being about ‘warnings’, listing negative indicators, following the risks at possible 
governance/coordinative failures. 
 
When discussing coordinative opportunities, we take as a point of departure that in a liberal 
state, the concern over sustainable energy, should ideally be a (‘mere’) matter of its promotion 
and safeguarding as a societal interest by private parties. If and when (because of market 
and/or network failure) this interest becomes a public interest, but still government would 
have to assess if this concern could primarily be taken up with private party involvement 
through regulated market or network coordination. Only, ultimately, when all else fails, a 
public interest – as that of sustainable energy – may become a matter of exclusive government 
policy formulation and execution. 
 
As in our first step, we have labelled sustainable energy as a public interest, we must now 
come to a comparative assessment of governance modes, as expressed by their distinct sets of 
coordinating mechanisms and accompanying value-orientations, without prejudice to 
hierarchical solutions. 
 
The basic thinking in market coordination is that economic agents acting rationally on the 
basis of full information (the price of an economic good, such as energy) make an assessment 
leading to an optimum outcome (efficiency). This outcome demands a perfect market, 
consistent with two basic value-characteristics: (i) ‘openness’ (as in transparency of 
information) and (ii) fair competition (providing an ‘exit’ option, to open bargaining with 
others). In legal terms these demands may be served by rules of consumer protection and fair 
competition. As to the latter, PPP in markets comes with a special twist, because in tendering 
or subsidising, government must avoid disturbance of markets as a ‘level playing field’ 
(compare, for example, the stringent EU rules on tendering and state-aid (EC, 2011)).  
Network coordination is described in public administration as a transaction mechanism 
enshrined in more or less stable patterns of relationships between mutually dependent actors 
formed around policy issues or policy programmes (Kickert et al, 1997, p. 6). In such a 
situation policy is the outcome of effective communication. This type of communication 
requires, firstly, inclusion and general acceptance. This is to say that all relevant interests 
within the network must be represented and equally respected, and that policy outcomes 
reached are accepted by all participants (not necessarily as consensus on all outcomes, but 
certainly on principle). Secondly, effective communication implies reciprocity, so that 
participants act accepting that direct consideration may not always be provided. It goes 
without saying that this can only work if ‘inclusion’ is sufficiently upheld. 
Hierarchical coordination is based upon the exercise of public authority by government. 
Under the Dutch doctrine of public authority, for instance, three clusters of values are 
considered vital (Heldeweg & Sanders 2011). Firstly, ‘democracy’, as citizens’ voice over 
government power (with the primacy of general people's representation – ‘representation over 
participation’), subsidiarity/ decentralisation, and openness. Secondly, ‘liberal rule of law’ as 
 10 
the separation of state and society, the primacy of civil autonomy, adherence of government 
to the law, separation of powers, legality, fundamental rights, legal protection, and 
embeddedness in the international legal order. Thirdly, ‘servient government’, as government 
does not exist for itself but for social justice for all, and should pursue this objective 
effectively and efficiently.  
 
In the earlier perspective of legitimate public governance, we can now merge the values listed 
in the above to the three dimensions as proposed by Beetham. Thus we yield three modes of 
(ideal type) ‘legitimate public governance’, which provide a normative beacon to 
government’s choice in choosing the proper type of coordination as a context in which to 
apply (a type of) PPP. Without further elaboration, these modes are summarised in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: legitimate value configurations of forms of coordination  
Step 2: Considering options of legitimate public governance 
 Dimensions. 
Beetham 
3 Modes of governance 
Market Network Hierarchy 
Legality Law on legal personality, 
property, contract, 
competition and consumer 
protection 
Law on legal personality 
and societal enterprise 
 
Constitutional & 
administrative law (‘rule 
of law’) 
Shared beliefs 
(all: Liberal state) 







servient government  
(‘Distributive justice’) 







Step 3: considering risks 
As a next step, the outcomes of the afore analysis, must be held against the characteristics of 
the public interest – here, sustainable energy – in terms of its technical nature, the action arena 
(and players within), and relevant policy principles. Each of these aspects may lead 
government to consider one mode of governance/coordination, with an accompanying type of 
PPP, before the other, or differentiate policy activity across different modes and types. For 
sustainable energy, the importance of infrastructure/grids (as aspect of its ‘technical nature’), 
the multi-level and multi-actor governance and related mixtures of interests (as features of the 
arena and actors), as well as reliability and universal access (as major policy principles) are 
important characteristics to be taken into consideration when choosing a suitable mode of 
governance/coordination relevant to applying PPP in this policy field.  
 
In more general terms this choice of coordination mode should come with the realisation that 
any form of coordination in innovative policy projects, such as on sustainable energy, 
involves the risk of a specific type of failure, again related to different modes of coordination: 
(i) market failure, (ii) network failure and (iii) hierarchical/government failure. In practice 
these categories of failure in innovative policy projects can express in a multitude of ways, 
reaching way beyond the descriptive scope of this paper. Table 3 suffices with giving a 
number of examples of each type of failure. 
 
Table 4: Forms of failure 
Step 3: Risks of failure in governance of innovative projects 
Risks Market Network  Hierarchy 
Forms of failure 
(with special relevance to 
innovation – examples) 
Lacking of investment, 
negative external or 
distributive effects of 
risks 
Inclusivity/exclusivity, 





lack of knowledge 
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Clearly, the seriousness (in likeliness and effects) of these risks must be assessed in 
conjunction with the aforementioned characteristics of the public interest at hand – i.e. 
sustainable energy. Failure to innovate and move forward in sustainable energy is not only a 
matter of ineffective policies, but also ties in with legitimacy. Pro-actively, stronger 
legitimacy (in society as a whole and amongst participants – especially in terms of shared 
beliefs and consent), may be a tool in improving chances at success. Retrospectively, failure 
may give rise to critical (societal) comments and a loss of trust in all or some of the 
participant’s willingness to secure success, and especially of government’s ability to deliver 
upon commitment to the public interest (and its choice of governance mode). 
In this respect, the above (innovation) risks also emphasise the need for ex ante attention to 
the ‘alignment’ of actor interests within the PPP arrangement. In our view a public interest is 
key to government involvement in PPP – as otherwise (in a liberal state) there would be no 
place for government in the PPP arrangement. As a consequence of this premise, ideally (to 
ensure ‘coordinative optimality’) the interests of private parties to a PPP must sufficiently and 
positively align with this public interest. If not, (non)actions of participants may become 
mutually counterproductive and the collective result is likely to be suboptimal (if not worse). 
We do not purport that alignment requires a full match or indeed identification – if this would 
even be theoretically and practically possible or feasible, but they should match in as much as 
is necessary to arrive at a common or shared strategy for (involvement in) the policy project at 
hand. At this it should be kept in mind that the innovative nature of a project poses inherent 
risks and may reveal to others (financial and reputational) vulnerabilities of participants, 
which make it all the more important that alignment of interests is secured. Further, we 
believe that the success of alignment (leading to a shared strategy) will correlate, also in terms 
of reciprocal expectations, with the mode of governance/ coordination mechanism upon 
which PPP is applied, and consequently (see step 4.) to the type of PPP that is chosen. 
 
Step 4: choosing the PPP type 
The two previous (positive and negative) considerations (of Steps 2. and 3.) should lead to an 
alignment enshrined in a proper choice of, not only the mode of governance/coordination, but 
also the corresponding type of PPP. These types list as three distinct governance 
arrangements, involved in the performance of different types of transactions, typical to 
markets, networks or hierarchies; according to their characteristic mode of coordination. In 
general we define a PPP as a legally structured partnership between one or more public 
authorities and one or more corporate entities governed by private law, which focuses on the 
development and execution of a common strategy for the realisation of a policy project 
(2012). The above implies that such a PPP can be applied within the three alternative modes 
of coordination. For this reason we distinguish the following types of PPP: ‘PPP for market 
coordination’ or ‘Market PPP’, ‘PPP for network coordination’ or ‘Network PPP’ and ‘PPP 
for hierarchical coordination’ or ‘Authority PPP’. Table 5 shows a summary of these PPP 
types, along four functional characteristics.  
 
Table 5: Types of PPPs (Sanders & Heldeweg 2012, Table 2)  
PPP 
4 Characteristics of 
functioning 
3 Types  

















by shared powers & 
responsibilities 




performance relations organisational 
behaviour 
with public authority 
Intended societal effect 
of results (outcomes) 
Steering behaviour by 
contractual obligations  
Steering behaviour by 
strategic coordination 




The objective of the Market PPP is about the executive or strategy to put a policy project into 
effect on the basis of a (mutually beneficial) economic exchange against the background of 
separate public and private positions (Smit, 2010). This leads to PPP as an operational 
configuration, as, within the field of sustainable energy policy initiatives, in the construction 
of durable utilities, such as wind farms for energy generation or smart grids for energy 
distribution (Heldeweg & Sanders 2011). Government formulates the project (possibly upon 
prior ‘private hints’) and then the phases from designing and building the construction or 
infrastructure through to maintenance and/or operation are put out to tender, as in the form of 
a DBFM(O) contract (Van Ham & Koppenjan 2002).
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 Thus government may, as a ‘launching 
customer’, use PPP in a field where, otherwise, market-players themselves would not 
spontaneously take up a sufficient number of projects or be successful in their promise. One 
could therefor argue that this type of PPP is a means of government remedying market failure 
in the sustainable energy field. 
 
In the ‘Network PPP’ there is partnership in an association, with the aim of formulating a joint 
strategy, such as when a municipality consults with retailers, housing corporations and 
electricity network operators about improved energy-efficiency of a given town centre, or 
when a foundation is established in which government, industry and NGO’s discuss strategy 
to bundle knowledge towards enhanced green gas deployment. Significantly, in this type of 
PPP public and private parties retain their own tasks, powers and responsibilities, so that 
implementation of the strategy by formal decisions to this effect remains a matter for each of 
the parties involved (Sanders & Heldeweg, 2011). One could consider this type of PPP a 
remedy to inadequacy of spontaneous private party networks, but also as an arrangement to 
overcome problems that markets and governments face in getting new initiatives underway by 
creating a stronger convergence in the sustainable energy momentum. 
 
Finally, we distinguish the ‘Authority PPP’, which is underpinned by partnership at the 
strategy formulation level, but which main (or indeed exclusive) task is taking decisions with 
public authority, binding to citizens, based in a legal power attributed to the PPP as a legal 
entity (Heldeweg & Sanders 2011). As an example in the sustainable energy sector, we could 
think of ‘energy funds’, operating as ‘participation quangos’, as partnerships within which 
representatives or appointees from government, industry and NGO’s, in union perform legal 
acts with public authority, such as providing subsidies, vouchers and guarantees to promising 
new initiatives that would otherwise not surface - from a fund financed by government, but 
possibly also by private parties involved.). Similarly, one could think of a PPP certification 
agency following a public law regulation on energy efficiency, which is governed by a board, 
composed of public and private party representatives or appointees.  
 
Step 5: choosing the legal form 
Once at ‘Step 4.’ the choice of governance/coordination and corresponding PPP-type has been 
made, a decision as regards its legal form is opportune. Different arguments play a part in the 
assessment process towards a choice of legal form, which also differ from one situation (such 
as the type of policy field) to another. The participants in a legal form may, for example, 
attach importance to limitation of liability or to tax transparency. In addition to participants, 
 13 
restrictions also follow from regulation, increasingly on a multi-level basis such as by EU 
rules. Together, these considerations guide the choice of a proper legal form. 
 
In the most general legal terms, a distinction may be made between three types of legal 
persons (Ruiter, 2004): (i) associations – rooted in personified alliances, where original long-
term contractual relations are transformed into collective decision making and membership; 
(ii) corporations – rooted in personified partnerships, where joint ownership of one or more 
objects and/or capital goods, are transformed into collective decision making and 
shareholdership; (iii) foundations – rooted in personified funds, where ownership of a 
collection of assets devoted to a specific objective is transformed into collective decision 
making and an objective purpose. These distinctions operate throughout the public and the 
private (law) realm, but do not exclusively correspond with the ideal type coordination 
mechanisms of markets, networks or hierarchies – although corporations best fit markets, and 
associations and foundations are most suitable to networks and hierarchies. Similarly PPP-
types may be moulded into all of the basic legal forms. Clearly, further analysis reaches well 
beyond the scope of this paper – given that, in our opinion, the nature of the sustainable 
energy field does not point at a particular choice in legal form. 
The same may be said about the possibility of organising PPP other than in a legal 
personality, but by entitlement (such as in property rights, such as in land), or by obligation 
(such as following contractual agreement). In reference to the above description of the 
‘Authority PPP’ we can rule out the possibility of a form other than as a legal entity, given 
that it can act only upon a (general but) personified legal power and accompanying personal 
accountability. 
Consequently, Table 6 merely aims to present the most basic elements of choice. 
 
Table 6: Summary of legal forms  
Step 5: Determination of the legal form of PPP 
 Legal forms 3 Modes of governance 
Market Network Hierarchy 
As entity  
(organisation) 
 




Esp. corporations  Esp. associations and 
foundations 
Esp. associations and 
foundations 
E.g. company (Ltd), 
cooperatives, 
partnership 







public office, quangos 










The need for innovation in the field of sustainable energy requires closer cooperation between 
public and private parties. We cannot expect that private parties within markets and social 
networks will, by themselves and spontaneously, provide timely innovative solutions. In turn, 
government, as ‘driven’ by the public interest in sustainable energy, cannot be expected to 
deliver on its own merit. Collaboration in the shape of PPP offers an attractive option to 
overcome mutual ‘failures’ and get new and innovative projects underway to (further) 
develop the policy to achieve the technological and practicable breakthroughs that are needed.  
The Salland Green Gas Project is a fine example of how government can pursue the public 
interest in sustainable energy by using private parties within the sector to provide 
technological innovations that government cannot deliver itself. 
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This paper has focused especially on how government may seek to use PPP against the 
backdrop of sustainable energy as a public interest. It shows that different types of PPP may 
be used to promote and safeguard public interests and that the choice between these types 
must be guided by the notion of ‘legitimate public governance’, which in turn requires proper 
reflection upon the most suited mode of governance/coordination. To this end an ex-ante 
analysis framework has been presented, providing a progressive scheme for making a proper 
choice of PPP. This analysis framework is built up in five consecutive steps: (i) establishing 
the public interest, (ii) considering legitimate public governance, (iii) considering risks, (iv) 
choosing the PPP type, and finally (v) choosing the legal form. 
 
We hope this framework, which is still the subject of further (empirical) research, will prove 
useful in the design of proper PPP arrangements, especially in the sustainable energy field – 
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1
 Van Genugten (2008, p. 5) categorises definitions of the public interest in two types: (i) economic approaches 
to public interests and (ii) politico-administrative reality approaches. With the WRR we prefer the latter 
approach. 
2
 This we name the ‘weak permission’ to private involvement – following the (equal) autonomy or freedom of 
private persons as an axiom of the liberal state. A ‘strong permission’ would imply involvement merely on the 
basis of an explicit allowance (Von Wright, 1963: 86).   
3
 See the Independent Grid Management Act (Wet Onafhankelijk Netbeheer), 23 November 2006, OJ 2006, 614 
(amended). 
4
 The climate accord “Working together on a climate-proof and sustainable Netherlands”, which was signed by 
central government and the Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) on 12 November 2007, is an example of 
such an administrative accord. See, unfortunately only in Dutch, http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/rapporten/2007/11/01/klimaatakkoord-gemeenten-en-rijk-2007-2011.html [July 25, 2012]. These 
climate accords also exist between the Association of Regional Water Authorities and central government and 
the provinces and central government; see, again only in Dutch, 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2010/04/12/waterschappen-en-rijksoverheid-ondertekenen-
klimaatakkoord.html [July 25, 2012]. 
5
 An example of a sustainability accord is the accord signed by the Cabinet and the business community (MKB-
Nederland, VNO-NCW and LTO Nederland) on 1 November 2007; see (only in Dutch, 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2007/11/02/kabinet-en-bedrijfsleven-ondertekenen-
duurzaamheidsakkoord.html [July 25, 2012]. 
6
 The European Commission is also seeking its salvation in PPP, witness some major initiatives, especially 
where innovation is important. An example of this is the Green Cars initiative; see http://www.green-cars-
initiative.eu/public/ [July 25, 2012]. 
7
 Private firms often include hierarchical coordination (as well as private property regimes may do in owner-user 
relations), but lay outside this papers scope.  
8
 This description allows for regulation, not only by legal incentives (strictly binding rules), but also by 
economic incentives (e.g. taxes, subsidies), ethical incentives (e.g. openness, public information) and technical 
incentives (public works & infrastructures). See Rhodes (1997) for a clear positioning of government (hierarchy) 
against governance – although we consider government/hierarchy as a mode of governance. . 
9
 Design, Build, Finance, Maintain (and Operate) (Van Ham & Koppenjan 2002) – with interaction (cf. the 
‘competition-oriented dialogue’), but not as independent goal (as with network and authority PPP).  
